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Abstract 
Financial institutions may enhance economic growth by raising the quantity, quality 
(productivity), and efficiency of investment. The structure of the German system is 
thought by many to have amplified these beneficial effects. Orthodox paradigms hold that 
through direct involvement with firms, the German universal banks funneled substantial 
amounts of financial capital into industry and credibly committed to behaving in the long­
run interest of firms. At the same time, by avoiding such engagement with industrial 
companies, British banks are thought to have disadvantaged that country's economy 
with respect to its continental counterparts. This paper uses aggregate bank balance 
sheet data to investigate systematic differences in the financial makeup and activities 
of universal and specialized banks. The paper first measures the rate of expansion and 
the ultimate magnitude of capital mobilized by the British and German banks. It then 
investigates the makeup of banks' asset portfolios and estimates the extent of direct 
involvement in equity ownership by the two types of banks. The findings suggest that, 
compared to the British banks, the German banks maintained at least as much liquidity 
relative to their short-term liabilities and held approximately the same (small) proportion 
of their assets in the form of non-government securities. Furthermore, the German banks 
seem to have held only a limited number of industrial equities in their portfolios and often 
did so merely because of insufficient markets for new issues. The findings suggest that the 
commonly-perceived gulf between specialized and universal banking may exaggerate the 
real differences in the systems' influences on economic growth and industrial development. 
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"The picture presented by the balance sheets of the banks must necessarily reflect 
that of the entire national economy, since the banks are the cash keepers of the 
nation. It is, therefore, hardly in accord with the truth to speak of or object to the 
banks as the 'leaders of national enterprise' or of domestic economic activity."2 
While most economists recognize that the financial system is a crucial component of any 
economy, there is much disagreement over the manner in which financial and real variables 
interact. The idea that financial institutions can actively promote growth is quite old. Joseph 
Schumpeter (1912) argued that bankers, through their screening and funding of entrepreneurs, 
encourage innovative activity and thereby spur economic growth. Thus, the early writing on 
the financial system took as a given both the asymmetry of information between investors and 
entrepreneurs and the role of the financial system in ameliorating s:uch information problems. 
Modern growth theory stresses the acquisition of human capital and the productivity of 
economic units (firms and entrepreneurs) as well as the traditionally-emphasized expansion of 
the physical capital stock. This literature has also made strides in incorporating the financial 
system into models of endogenous growth. The recent work of Robert King and Ross Levine 
(1993), for example, formalizes the Schumpeterian view into the framework of an endogenous 
growth model. In their model, the financial system affects productivity growth through four 
channels: screening prospective entrepreneurs in order to select the most promising projects, 
11 am grateful to Lance Davis, Barry Eichengreen, John Latting, and Peter Temin for helpful comments and 
discussions and to the NSF (grant # SBR-9617799) for funding this research. 
2 Jakob Riesser (1911) ,  p. 566. 
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mobilizing capital to fund investments, diversifying investors' portfolios to eliminate risk, and 
revealing the potential benefits of participating in productivity-enhancing activities. 
Expansion of the financial sector has proven to go hand in hand with economic growth, 
but the direction of causality is still uncertain.3 Joan Robinson (1952) suggested that fina�cial 
systems develop in response to prospects in the real sector, yet the literature over the last decade 
has tended to argue that the real sector responds to financial development. The evidence seems 
to support the view that the extent and depth of the financial system positively correlates with 
future economic growth, but problems of omitted variables and robustness undermine such 
findings.4 Jeremy Greenwood and Bruce Smith (1997) offer what may be the most reasonable 
compromise: a model in which financial markets arise after some period of real development, 
and the expansion of those markets fuels further real growth. 5 
Despite the burgeoning research on finance and growth, the importance of financial system 
structure has yet to be determined. Much of the debate over banking reform in the United 
States hinges on the assumption that certain types of financial systems allocate an economy's 
resources more efficiently than others. There is a widespread sense in the US and the UK that 
the universal banking systems of Germany and Japan have given those countries an advantage 
in industrial development and economic growth over much of the past century and a half. 
The German banks in particular have been lauded for their role during the period of indus-
trialization before World War I. The perceived advantages of the German-style banks revolve 
3Early studies include Goldsmith (1969) ,  McKinnon (1973) , and Shaw (1973). 
4The more recent literature considering the causal relationship between finance and growth includes King and 
Levine (1993), Tullio Japelli and Marco Pagano (1993), Jith Jayaratne and Philip Strahan (1996) ,  and Rajan 
and Zingales (1997) . Robert Lucas (1988), perhaps not surprisingly, expresses doubt about the importance of 
financial factors and excludes these considerations in his model of development. 
5 A logical implication of this model is that exogenous creation of a financial system with advanced features 
may not spur real growth. The problem then for implementing development policy is determining how to get 
poor countries to the point at which financial systems will arise endogenously. 
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around both the organization of the banks and the policies of the banks' operators. The combi-
nation of commercial banking, securities underwriting, and brokerage services characteristic of 
the universal banks is thought by many to have yielded eceoomies of scope and therefore greater 
efficiency. Such efficiency has been argued in turn to have reduc'ed the costs of finance and qms . 
promoted industrial investment.6 Furthermore, the much-emphasized close, long-term relation-
ships German banks are thought to have maintained with industrial firms arguably aligned the 
incentives of banks and firms and encouraged multi-period optimization of their behavior. The 
German banks are variously credited with mobilizing capital for domestic industry, screening 
potential entrepreneurs, promoting and re-organizing whole industries, deciding on investment 
and production strategies, monitoring the progress of clients' investments, arranging and en-
forcing propitious industrial combinations, and diversifying the risk associated with innovative 
activities. 
In contrast, the banks have become a perennial scapegoat for the apparent under-performance 
of the British economy since the late Victorian era. A long line of critics has assumed that 
British industry has been constrained by a lack of capital and that the banks could have, but 
refused to, provide necessary finance to industry. Moreover, many have chastised the British 
banks for avoiding engagement with domestic industry and leaving firms to find finance from 
other sources. The banks' involvement in foreign and imperial ventures is claimed to have 
drained away funds from domestic industry; firms' resultant recourse to securities markets 
is argued to have advanced investors ' short-term profit motives at the expense of long-term 
growth.7 
6Most recently, Charles Calomiris (1995) has advanced this idea. 
7For a review of the literature on British banking and industrial development, see Michael Collins (1991) . 
Also see Forrest Capie and Collins (1992). For a critical appraisal of the British banking system, see George 
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In short, the German banks are thought not only to have engaged in all of the activities 
seen as central to the Schumpeterian model of finance and growth, but to have executed these 
functions more effectively and efficiently than the British banks. In light of the continuing 
debates over the relative efficacy of German and British banking, at least two lines of historical 
investigation need to be pursued. The first step is to establish the extent to which the German 
banks offered the myriad benefits that have been ascribed to them; the second step is to 
determine whether the provision of these services by a single institution (that is, the universal 
banks) created synergies that fueled economic growth. 
The British banks were not, however, prohibited from combining functions or from pursu-
ing long-term relationships with industrial firms. Thus, research on the real effects of financial 
structure must accept that, if the British banks' organization and activities were sub-optimal 
for industrial growth, such inefficiency stemmed from market failures of one sort or another: . 
rationing of relatively low-return or high-risk ventures or inability to perceive or act upon fa-
vorable prospects.8 Moreover, most of the growth literature that incorporates a financial sector 
makes little distinction among systems. The empirical literature considers all components of the 
financial system together in measuring financial development, and recent cross-country com-
parisons typically find correlations between real growth and financial depth broadly defined. 
If the significant divide in growth rates arises between more- and less-developed financial sys-
terns, then economists and historians must also contend with the possibility that the form of 
the financial system yields second-order effects on productivity and growth. 
Edwards ( 1987) . 
8It seems that specialized institutions staked out certain territories in the financial system, and those divisions 
may have been difficult to overcome. Nonetheless, the deposit banks did inch toward investment and brokerage 
services toward the end of the nineteenth century. Ironically, at the same time, many Germans were calling for 
reform of the universal banks into a specialized system modeled along British lines. 
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A principle reason for the persistence of debates over the relative benefits of particular fi-
nancial systems is that the research thus far largely evaluates systems ·independently of one 
another.9 Thus, individual country studies often "measure the given systems against imaginary 
yardsticks. This paper uses aggregate bank balance sheet data to investigate systematic differ-
ences in the financial makeup and activities of universal and specialized banks. By explicitly 
comparing the British and German banks, this work takes steps toward quantifying the possible 
disparity in financial system growth effects over the decades leading up to World War One. 
Financial systems are thought to influence both the quantity and quality of investment. 
Thus, this paper first measures the rate of expansion and the ultimate magnitude of capital 
mobilized by the British and German banks. The paper then investigates the makeup of banks' 
asset portfolios and estimates the extent of direct involvement in equity ownership by the two 
types of banks. The findings suggest that, compared to the British banks, the German banks 
maintained at least as much liquidity relative to their short-term liabilities and held approx-
imately the same (small) proportion of their ass�ts in the form of non-government securities. 
Furthermore, the German banks seem to have held only a limited number of industrial equities 
in their portfolios and often did so merely because of insufficient markets for new issues. 
The results offer insights into both differences and similarities in the organization of banking 
in Germany and the UK specifically and into the historical importance of financial structure 
more generally. The findings suggest that the commonly-perceived gulf between specialized and 
9Tilly (1986), an important exception, compares the British and German systems along several lines and finds 
some notable similarities as well as differences. Colin Mayer (1988) and Julian Franks and Mayer (1995) provide 
abundant evidence on financial and corporate structure for several European countries and the US and Japan. 
This work, however, does not make the connection to economic growth. George Edwards (1987) makes some 
international comparisons in his wide-ranging critique of the British banking system; Calomiris (1995) contrasts 
the US and German systems and attempts to estimate relative costs of securities underwriting; and William 
Kennedy and Rachel Britton (1985) compare portfolio efficiency in Britain and Germany. 
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universal banking may exaggerate the real differences in the systems' influence on economic 
growth and industrial development. 
The Link Between Bank Structure and Growth 
The fundamental role of the financial system in any economy is to mediate between the 
supply of and demand for capital. In doing so, intermediaries mobilize otherwise idle resources 
to be used in productive investment. In order to formalize the link between the functioning of 
the financial system and the growth of the real economy, a· wide array of theoretical models has 
appeared in the growth and development literatures in the past decade.10 For their motivation, 
nearly all appeal to the observed correlations between financial system development and indus-
trial growth uncovered by economic historians and development economists during the 1960s 
and '70s. 1 1  
Financial intermediaries can be made to arise in endogenous growth models by assuming 
heterogeneity in the quality of entrepreneurs and projects, possible monopoly returns to in-
novation, relatively large-scale and illiquid capital requirements, and the potential to diversify 
risk through pooling. In comparison to the traditional growth models, in which output was 
seen as a function of capital, labor, and disembodied technological progress, the current models 
provide a richer framework for interpreting the potential impact of financial systems.12  
Pagano (1993) provides a simple way to summarize the newer models of finance and growth. 
Assuming away the complications of population growth, intermediate goods, and market struc-
1°For an overview of some of the literature see Marco Pagano (1993) and Alexander Galetovic (1996). Jeremy 
Greenwood and Bruce Smith (1997) provide more technical details. 
· 
1 1Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) ,  and Shaw (1973) are the standard references. 
12In the older models, the relationship between output (Yt), physical capital (Kt), and labor (Lt ) is defined 
� Yt = 1tF(Kt1 Nt)i and At is assumed to be productivity. Then output growth can be formulated as Y /Y  = 
K/K+L/L+A/A. 
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ture, endogenous growth models yield a reduced-form equation in which output is a linear 
function of capital (Kt), Yt = AKt. This formulation ari�es from the models related to those 
of both Paul Romer (1989) and Robert Lucas (1988).13 Ignoring depreciation and assuming a 
closed economy with no government sector, gross investment Ut) is the first difference of the 
. 
. 
capital stock and is equal in equilibrium to net savings (</>St)· Net savings is simply that portion 
of gross savings not expended on the costs of intermediation (1 - </>). 
The steady-state growth rate of output, Y /Y, is equivalent to the growth rate of capital, 
k / K. Using the capital market equilibrium condition yields 
g = A</>s, (1) 
wheres is the gross savings rate, S/Y. This relationship underscores the primary links between 
the financial system and growth rates. Financial institutions may enhance economic growth by 
raising the total quantity of financial capital available to entrepreneurs ( s), improving the qual-
ity (productivity) of investments (A), and increasing the efficiency ofintermediation between 
the sources and uses of funds ( </>) .14 
This framework can help in comparing the effectiveness of the German and British banking 
systems, but further refinement is required in order to clarify the ways in which financial 
institutions affect the variables in the growth formula. The following sections take some first 
13In the Romer model, N identical firms produce with a constant returns production function, Yt = Bkt"', and 
productivity increases in the capital stock (B = Akt1-"'). Aggregate output is simply N times an individual 
firm's output. In the Lucas model, Kt is a composite of physical and human capital. 
14The reduced-form version of the model does not prove that the existence of financial systems increases growth 
over the rates obtained under financial autarky. Greenwood and Smith (1997) provide a first step toward thinking 
about such distinctions; showing that growth rates obtained in economies with either banks or equity markets 
exceed those of economies without financial intermediaries. Though most of the literature offers no comparison 
of the relative benefits of different types of financial systems, the Greenwood and Smith (1997) model shows 
that,_ with sufficient risk aversion on the part of the investing public, equity markets produce stronger growth than do banks. Further theoretical inroads into such questions are still required. 
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steps at comparing the impact of specialized and universal banking systems on the quantity 
and quality of investment. 
Quantity of Investment 
Theories of economic growth, both old and new, indicate ·a role for banks in the expansion 
of capital. Banks typically influence the accumulation of physical capital by directing funds to 
entrepreneurs who wish to invest. Such capital mobilization proceeds in two stages: collection of 
capital through deposit taking or sales of equity shares, and dispersion of the gathered funds in 
the form of loans or advances. By repeating this process, the banking system multiply expands 
the money supply and effectively redistributes the economy's capital. These banking functions 
increase the share of resources directed to productive investment ( s in equation 1). 
The German universal banks have often been credited with mobilizing significant amounts 
of capital from the public and thereby promoting industrial growth. The British banks, by 
comparison, are typically presumed to have participated less aggressively in the accumulation 
of funds. Goldsmith's international tabulation of financial system assets allows direct compar­
ison of the magnitude of capital mobilized by the banks and also illuminates the institutional 
structures in the two countries at various points between 1860 and 1913 (Table I) .  
Total assets of financial institutions as a share of gross national product grew substantially 
in both Britain and Germany over the period but expanded more in the latter than in the 
former. Furthermore, while Britain's ratio exceeded Germany's in 1860, the British lagged the 
Germans by 1900. The gap grew to over 50 percent by World War I.15 
Table I here. 
15The pattern reversed after the wars, and as of 1963, Britain led Germany again by a substantial margin. 
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The differences in structure of the British and German financial sectors complicates direct 
comparison of the two cases. Virtually all of the functions relating to corporate finance fell 
under the purview of one institution in Germany: the UH:iversal bank. The British financial 
system did not observe a strict dichotomy between long-term,· investment banking and sh<?rt-. 
term commercial services, but only the German system explicitly combined the two types of 
business. Formal securities markets provide complementary services to those offered by banks, 
and the former presumably represent a greater portion of the financial system in Britain than 
in Germany. Furthermore, much secondary securities trading fell outside of the British banks' 
operations but within those of the Germans' business. Thus, comparing the German universal 
banks to the British deposit (commercial) banks underestimates the share of corporate financing 
institutions in the British economy. Nonetheless, at 50 to 60 percent, British deposit banks and 
private banks accounted for twice the share of total financial institution assets in that country 
as the German universal banks (of both joint-stock and private forms) did in Germany. When 
the British discount houses and investment trusts are included, the gap widens. 
Given the traditional emphasis on the universal banks' role in the promotion of industri­
alization and economic growth in Germany, the share of the universal banks in both financial 
assets and GNP seems relatively small. Furthermore, the sharp increase in the share of the 
universal banks in Germany between 1900 and 1913, especially compared to the more gradual 
increases (or decline, when the private banks are included) from 1860 to 1880, raises doubts 
about the causal link from the expansion of the universal banks to the growth of industry. 
In contrast, the largest increase in the British deposit banks' share of assets canie between 
1860 and 1880, and the growth rate leveled off thereafter. This pattern is closer to the ex­
pectations for the prevalence of financial institutions over the development of the economy: as 
9 
the economy matures, the banks should play a diminishing role in the mobilization of capital. 
Part of the difference in the changing prevalence of the British and German banks in the econ-
omy may stem from the structure and practices of those banks. The German universal banks 
are widely reputed as having internalized the secondary market in securities. The continued 
expansion of the universal banks, therefore, may represent the expansion of the market for 
securities. 
The ultimate impact of the banks' activities depends directly on the amount of funds assem-
bled by the financial system and inversely upon the proportion of the system's assets retained 
in the form of cash reserves. In a simple model of a monetary economy with financial interme-
diaries and currency holding by the public, the total nominal money stock (Ml) is a function 
of the nominal monetary base (currency plus reserves) ,  the ratio of bank deposits to currency, 
and the cash reserve ratio.16 
(Ml) = 
[l + Ht(l - It) ] M t 
Qt x 
t, (2) 
such that Ht is the real stock of inside money (deposits) ,  Qt is the real stock of currency balances, 
/ is the cash reserve ratio, and Mt is the nominal monetary base. Financial intermediaries 
maintain partial control over both the reserve ratio and the deposit-to-currency ratio. 
Banks can raise the deposit-to-currency ratio by encouraging individuals to d�posit their 
savings or buy equity shares in the bank. The Goldsmith data in Table I indicates that, while 
the universal banks' assets were expanding as a share of German GNP, the British deposit 
banks accounted for a greater share of that country's GNP at each point in the pre-War era. 
16See Bruce Champ and Scott Freeman (1994) and sources cited there. 
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Total bank assets (or liabilities) less cash offers· another measure of the volume of capital 
mobilized by the British and German commercial banks. As a share of GNP, liabilities less 
cash in the British deposit banks exceeded that i� the German universal banks by a significant 
margin from 1883 until after the turn of the twentieth century (Figure 1). 17 While the gap 
between the UK and Germany seems to have mostly closed by the outset of World War I, the 
series diverge again during the war and its aftermath. 
Figure 1 here. 
Figure 1 also reveals a clear difference in growth rates of liabilities less cash per capita 
in the two countries. When the shift in coverage for the British series is taken into account, 
the trend for that country is relatively fl.at. The German figures, in contrast, indicate gradual 
expansion before 1894, but rapid growth thereafter.18 The disparity in growth rates may be 
explained by the different patterns of industrial development of the two countries, however, the 
late development of the German joint-stock banks is somewhat surprising. Joint-stock universal 
' banks began to form in 1848, yet the institution seems to have taken off more than fortr years 
later and after the industrialization pushes of the mid-nineteenth century. 19 
While the commercial banks clearly represented a greater share of the economy in the UK 
17The British data come from the Economist series as reported in Sheppard (1971) and include private banks 
starting in 1891. The solid line in Figure 1 estimates the joint-stock banks' liabilities based on the ratio of private 
to joint-stock banks in 1891 ,  but that ratio likely declined significantly between 1891 and 1913. The German 
data report only joint-stock banks for the whole period. Since the private banks accounted for a greater share of 
bank assets in Germany than in the UK, the omission of private banks may exaggerate the British lead. Even if 
estimated figures for the German private banks are added, however, some gap in liabilities less cash per capita 
still remained as late as 1913. Furthermore, the denominator for the German series is net national product, and 
the ratio may therefore overestimate bank liabilities as a share of GNP. The GNP /NNP data come from Mitchell 
(1978) 
18Regression of of the log of liabilities less cash on a time trend yields an estimated annual average growth 
rate of 8.6 percent in the post-1894 period as opposed to a rate of 5.1 percent beforel894. 
19To some extent, the apparent late take-offof the universal banks is due to the switch to the joint-stock form. 
Private banks were more prevalent before 1894 than after. Inclusion of the private banks would flatten the trend, 
but it is not clear that the private banks provided the same services in the same way as the later joint-stock 
banks. 
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than in Germany, the universal banks may have expanded available capital at a faster rate. 
Indeed, the faster growth rate of German bank liabilities compared to British bank liabilities 
suggests this _!P.ight have been the case. Two measures offer some insight into the banks' role 
in multiple expansion. The simple representation of the money supply (equation 2)  indicated 
that the money multiplier is a negative function of the cash-deposit ratio. In the case in which 
banks are financed by equity or private capital' in addition to deposits, a more relevant ratio 
may be the cash-liabilities ratio. In comparing the British and German cases, both ratios are 
informative. 20 
For Germany, the cash-liability ratio hovered in the five to six percent range in the late 
1880s and early 1890s, but it declined considerably after 1893. The declines in the German 
universal banks' cash-liability ratio coincides with the growth of liabilities less cash of those 
banks. Over the same period, the British banks seem to have maintained considerably higher 
cash-liability ratios, and the gap appears to have widened after 1893 (Figure 2 ) .  
Theoretically, at least, the cash-liability ratio affects monetary expansion, interest rates, and 
economic growth. Yet banks' holdings of cash cannot be taken as exogenous, and differences 
in the way in which British and German banks funded themselves help explain part of the gap 
in cash-liability ratios. British deposit banks financed a greater share of their operations with 
deposits than did the German universal banks, and the provincial banks in the UK also issued 
notes. After the formation of the German central bank (the Reichsbank) in 1876, universal 
· banks were prohibited from issuing their own notes. 
Given the divergent liability structures of the German and British banks, the cash-deposit 
20The data for the two ratios come from two sources: Sheppard's (1971 [1873]) compilation of the Economist's 
series and Capie and Webber's (1985) newer estimates. The latter only provide cash and deposit figures, so the 
cash-liabilities ratio cannot be calculated from this source. 
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ratio offers greater insight into the banks' participation in changing short-term liabilities into 
longer-term assets (maturity transformation) . Among the German universal banks, cash-
deposit ratios follow a similar, though more extreme, pattern as cash-liabilities ratios; rising 
over the late 1880s and declining after 1893. Until the last years of the nineteenth century, Ger-
. 
. 
man cash-deposit ratios exceeded the UK ratios, and the gap reached as much as ten percentage 
points around 1891. 
Unfortunately, the Deutsche Bundesbank's aggregate data for Germany begin only in 1883, 
so it is difficult to compare the system-wide cash ratios before then. Walther Hoffman (1965) 
compiled statistics on share capital from several sources and estimated the balance sheet struc-
ture from some of those sources. 21 According to the Hoffman data, the German joint-stock 
banks' reserve-deposit ratios varied considerably between the early 1850s and the mid 1870s. 
Though data are absent from 1863 to 1868, the data for the other years indicate that the banks 
appear to have maintained higher reserve ratios in the third quarter of the nineteenth century 
than in the ensuing forty years (Figure 3) .  
Further insight into reserve holdings emerges from historical accounts of one of the largest 
German banks, the Disconto-gesellschaft. Naturally, aggregate trends cannot necessarily be 
inferred from the experience of a single bank, but a comparison of years in which the series 
overlaps with that for the nine Berlin great banks (1884-1900) yields encouraging results. With 
the exception of two or three years, the DG ratio falls within a couple of percentage points of 
the great-bank aggregate ratio. 22 
21Hoffman did not report cash, but he did give reserves and total deposits (including current accounts). Using 
reserves as an estimate of cash allows construction of a reserve-deposit ratio. In the later years in which the 
sources overlap, the reserve ratio series is nearly identical to the cash-deposit ratio series constructed from the 
Bundesbank data. Between 1883 and 1895, however, the Hoffman series falls significantly below the Bundesbank 
series. 
22Note that Figure 3 shows the figures for all joint-stock banks. The largest Berlin banks and the London 
13 
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If the DG figures correspond at all to trends in the other Berlin banks' cash ratios, then 
the data suggest that the Berlin banks held higher proportions of cash than the London joint-
stock banks for most of the period from 1871 to 1900. The Hoffman figures suggest similar 
conclusions for the joint-stock banks as a whole, though the British and German figures are 
quite close during the late 1870s and early 1880s. In the absence of figures for London banks 
before 1870, it is difficult to know how the German and British trends compare. Numbers for 
the London and Westminster Bank, reported in Walter Bagehot (1962),  indicate cash-deposit 
ratios for this one institution between 10 and 20 percent from 1845 to 1857. 
Perhaps of greater interest, the Hoffman, Disconto-gesellschaft, and London and Westmin-
ster numbers all suggest the potential variability of cash ratios. While the extreme fluctuations 
of the DG series likely stem partly from idiosyncracies of this bank, all three series demon-
strate significant ups and downs that probably reflect changes in the economy at large. Such 
movements thus underscore the dependence of cash ratios on factors often outside the control 
of banks. 
Neither the British nor the German banks were bound by minimum reserve requirements 
in the pre-World War I period. Legally, then, the reserve ratios in both systems depended on 
the judgement of the bankers. Some have argued, however" that the Bank of England tacitly 
imposed a ratio on commercial banks. The data on cash ratios indicate that the British deposit 
banks held relatively steady cash ratios throughout the end of the nineteenth and the start of 
the twentieth centuries. The London joint-stock banks, as a group, appear to have maintained 
cash balances between 10 and 15 percent of deposits. While the data certainly cannot prove 
banks all held significantly higher cash ratios than their provincial counterparts, though the gap in Germany 
gradually disappeared as the banking sector concentrated (between 1900 and 1913). 
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the role of the central· bank, the apparent floor at ten percent lends credibility to the notion 
that the Bank of England held some sway over the banks' minimum cash ratio. 
In contrast, the largest German banks kept aggregate r-atios as low as 7 percent and as high 
as 22 percent. Thus, if the Reichsbank was trying to impose a minimum reserve, it was eitI:er . 
a low bound or it was largely disregarded by the banks. Commentaries from the early years 
of this century indicate that bankers, politicians, and economists often debated the need for 
a required reserve, but little was done toward imposing regulations like those enacted in the 
us.2a 
Whether the British and German central banks imposed minimum reserve ratios on com-
mercial banks, such regulations would only create a lower bound. A profit maximizing bank will 
hold reserves up to the point at which the expected (opportunity) cost of holding cash equals 
the expected benefit of lending out those funds. The expected cost of idle cash is equal to 
the expected gross return on alternative uses of the funds less the transactions costs associated 
with investing. 24 The expected benefit of holding cash is then the expected price of obtaining 
reserves times the probability of needing those reserves. Thus, at least four variables directly 
influence banks' choice of reserve holdings. 
On the benefit side, both government policy and securities markets help shape expectations 
about the availability of reserves. If the central bank credibly commits to acting as a lender of 
last resort, then the benefits of holding cash decline. Likewise, efficient and liquid secondary 
23Most proposals recommended required cash holdings of one to five percent of the sum of deposits and current 
account balances to be held at the Reichsbank. Defenders of the German joint-stock banks claimed that the 
British banks held much slimmer reserves than the Germans. The British banks were accused of padding their 
reserves for their semi-annual statements of account. See Riesser (1910, 11) and sources cited there. Goodhart 
(1972) also discusses the reporting practices of the British banks. 
240f course, with an imperfectly competitive banking sector, banks may hold excessive reserves in order to 
exercise market power. 
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markets in industrial securities offer further assurance about the accessibility of cash reserves. 
Both of these factors could be expected to influence banks' asset portfolios, but both should 
have long-term effects. Central bank credibility, almost by definition, cannot fluctuate from 
year to year; and secondary markets' size and liquidity, are likely to change gradually. 
The data from the Disconto-gesellschaft and the Hoffman series indicate large fluctuations 
in cash ratios from the 1850s through the early 1870s, but smaller annual changes after 1875. 
Reduced variability of cash ratios may stem partly from increasing credibility of the central 
monetary authority. The unification and regulation of the German currency as well as the 
institution of the Reichsbank in 1876 likely lowered the perceived costs of obtaining reserves 
during crises.25 In Germany, the downturns of the early 1890s and 1900-01 were met with 
much smaller increases in cash ratios than the recessionary years of 1857 and 1872. Likewise, 
the onset of World War I seems to have spurred only a mild increase in cash ratios compared 
to the spike (at least at the DG) during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. 
The Bank of England has a much longer history, and its role both as lender of last resort 
and as regulating authority may have been relatively secure in the minds of British bankers. 
The combination of these two functions probably dampened the potential swings in cash ra­
tios: limiting the need to pad reserves in recessionary periods, and restraining the impulse to 
drop reserves in expansionary years. If the London and Westminster numbers reflect broader 
patterns in England, however, then British cash ratios may have also fluctuated more in the 
mid-nineteenth century than they did after 1870. 
The liquidity of the British banks' secondary reserves, however, may have begun to decline 
starting in the 1890s. While government securities ranked among the most secure options for 
25The Reichsbank was founded in 1875 but began operation at the start of 1876. 
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UK banks' secondary reserves, some doubt, at least in the case of British Consols, began to 
arise toward the end of the 1890s: "It was formerly said that you could sleep on Consols and 
'sell them on a Sunday.' A banker can certainly do.the first now, but we are by no means so sure 
that he could do the second"26 Thus, the gradual increase in cash ratios after the mid-1890s 
may also partly reflect a substitution away from government securities. 
The probability of needing reserves, on the other hand, may vary considerably from year 
to year. Economic expansion and low rates of business failures likely decrease the probability 
of needing reserves and therefore lower the benefit of holding cash. In addition, systematic 
differences in the type of investments made may lead to variation in cash reserves from one 
financial system to another, and such disparities may persist for several years. 
Expected rates of return on investments may also change significantly from year to year, 
but are likely to have a trend component as well. Increases in expected returns, either because 
of a contraction in the supply of funds or due to improvements in opportunities, raises the 
opportunity cost of holding cash, increases ban� lending, and lowers banks' cash holdings. 
Costs of investing provide a countervailing force to expected rates of return on investments. 
Progress in information, communications, and transportation, for example, would tend to lower 
transactions costs, raise net returns on investment and lower cash reserves. 
The changing patterns of cash ratios in both Britain and Germany could partly reflect 
the vast improvements in infrastructure from the middle of the nineteenth century on. The 
experience of the Wales Bank during the crisis of 1878 (in the UK) offers some support for 
such an hypothesis: "happily methods of transport were at this stage much swifter than on 
26The Bankers' Magazine, 1900, quoted in Goodhart, 1972, p. 127. Also see W. F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth 
(1936) , p. 192. 
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a similar occasion thirty years earlier . . .  Accordingly, the demands were fully met and the run 
quicky subsided." 27 
Clearly, mcgiy of the factors involved in determining the cash-deposit ratio fall outside the 
purview of the banks; thus, the structure of the banks themselves may have a limited impact on 
the ratios maintained. At the same time, the banks do maintain significant control over their 
investment portfolios, and the riskiness of those portfolios must also affect the banks' assessment 
of the need for cash reserves. Banks' structure and activities may significantly influence the 
composition of asset portfolios, and the different levels of bank specialization may therefore 
partly explain the somewhat divergent patterns of cash ratios-and thus of capital expansion-of 
British and German banks. 
Quality of Investments 
The banks' role in mobilizing capital is intimately tied to its involvement in the utilization of 
funds .. Through decisions about how to lend and invest funds, banks can influence the quality 
of capital formation (A in· equation 1 ) .  As with capital mobilization, the German universal 
banks are thought by many to have offered advantages over the British banks in promoting 
the efficient use of financial capital. The literatures on German and British banking have 
suggested that the British banks invested rather conservatively, while the German banks opted 
for riskier strategies. Such risky investment, it is argued, channeled funds into high-growth and 
high-return industries and helped promote Germany's industrialization.28 
Contemporary critics of the universal banks, particularly of the great banks, accused the 
27 Crick and Wadsworth (1936), p. 190. 'A similar occasion thirty years earlier' refers to the banking eris.is of 
1847. 
28Tilly {1986) points out that given that the main clientele of the universal banks appears to have been large, 
older, publicly-traded enterprises, the banks may not have been actively involved in risky, innovative investment 
in general. 
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banks of fomenting stock market speculation with their excessive provision of credit. Yet 
Jakob Riesser (1910, 1911) argued at length that the Ger�an banks invested more safely and 
conservatively than the British banks. Defenders of the German banks, those who resisted the 
calls for reform toward the British model of banking, claimed that the British banks lent to 
. 
. 
brokers who in turn swindled the public with speculative ventures.29 
For influencing the quality of investment, the crucial organizational advantage of the German 
banks is their supposed long-term direct participation in industrial firms. By holding industrial 
shares, the banks are thought to have monitored and even controlled the firms they financed. 
The British banks, in contrast, are traditionally accused of having little to do with industry 
and are criticized for taking a short-term, arms-length approach to industrial lending. 
There are several theoretical reasons why bank equity holdings may increase the efficiency 
of investment. Many of these hypothesis originate in the idea that asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders pose extra costs and create inefficiencies in the selection and 
funding of investment projects. Cost reductions may result from disciplining of management, 
oversight of investment planning and outcomes, optimizing risk-taking by firms, and aligning 
banks and firms incentives for long-term benefits.30 
Kose John, et. al. (1994) model the effects of equity ownership on the risk-taking of firms 
and show that investment efficiency increases in the proportion of bank financing held in the 
form of equity. Imperfect oversight of investment choices and outcomes creates incentives for 
firms to use borrowed funds in an excessively risky manner. When banks maintain veto power 
29Riesser ( 1910, 1911) cites sources (Heiligenstadt and Jaffe, for example). It should be borne in mind that 
Riesser was a director of one of the largest Berlin banks. 
30Myers and Majluf (1984) analyze many of these theoretical issues and provide a formal model of the potential 
suboptimality of investment under asymmetric information. 
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over the use of funds, pure debt holdings induce the bank to minimize risk in order to guarantee 
the fixed return. Equity holdings, in contrast, encourage the bank to seek higher firm valuation. 
Thus, the greater the banks' equity holdings in the firm, the closer the banks' incentives are to 
the efficient tradeoff between risk and expected return. 
In related work, Anat Admati and Paul Pfleiderer (1994) also demonstrate the potential 
importance of equity stake holders in resolving agency problems associated with multi-period 
financial contracts. Explicitly motivated by modern perceptions of the German and Japanese 
banking systems, this model shows that the efficiency of inside investing hinges on the use 
of fixed fraction contracts. In such arrangements, the investor receives a fixed percentage of 
project returns and finances that same proportion of future investments. 31 
According to these theoretical arguments, banks that hold firm equity stakes improve the 
efficiency of investment. Thus, the relative extent of equity holdings in the portfolios of British 
and German firms offers one way to assess the direct involvement of the banks in raising 
investment quality. 32 
The British banks' total securities holdings ranged between 13 and 20 percent of total 
assets between 1884 and 1913, while those of the German banks stayed between 9 and 15 
percent over the same period. Moreover, the British ratios �emained above the German ratios 
for the entire period. As previous authors have pointed out, the British banks held a substantial 
proportion of their investments in the form of British and colonial government and government-
guaranteed assets. Since such assets are unrelated to industrial finance, and are typically more 
secure than other types of securities, it is important to compare asset distributions net of 
31Repeated interaction naturally adds the problem of renegotiation. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Persons 
( 1994), and Dybvig and Zender (1991) all address this question. 
32The remainder of this section borrows heavily from Fohlin ( 1997c) . 
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government securities. Thus, Figure 4 compares non-government securities for the two countries. 
Because of the uncertainties about valuation and reporting, these figures should be viewed as 
approximations. 33 
Figure 4 here. 
When government securities are excluded, the ratios are much closer together; however, 
the German banks still show no consistent tendency toward higher securities holdings than the 
British banks. Indeed, according to these estimates, the range was nearly identical in the two 
countries (7 to 12 percent for the German banks and 8 to 12 percent for the British). 
The figures, it should be noted, provide as conservative an estimate as possible of the 
German and British non-government securities holdings. The Scottish and Irish deposit banks 
held higher levels of investments than did their English and Welsh counterparts, and the largest 
of the German universal banks held more of their assets .in the form of securities than did the 
provincial banks. Therefore, the fact that Figure 4 still shows the British banks' securities 
holdings on par with the Germans' provides a strong indication that, despite the difficulties 
in measurement, the British banks held a similar position in non-government securities as the 
German banks. 
Such a finding would fall in line with expectations, if one thought that the two types of 
33The Sheppard series gives British government and government-guaranteed investments separately from all 
others, but such disaggregation for the German figures begins only in 1912. The figures for the years before that 
are estimated on the basis of the lowest holdings of government securities between 1912 and 1920 as well as on 
the detailed account of one of the great banks between 1896 and 1899. The proportion for great banks ranged 
from 17.6 to 28.6 percent of total securities held between 1912 and 1920. Given that this period covers the 
first World War, it would be natural to expect that government securities might comprise a higher proportion 
of securities than they did in the preceding years. In the one detailing of bank securities holdings that I could 
find for the period before 1900 (Bank fiir Handel und Industrie, a great bank) , government securities amounted 
to 24 to 55 percent of total securities (in the period 1896-1899). Thus, since I am trying to err on the side of 
finding high rates of non-government securities holdings, 17 percent seemed a conservative enough estimate of 
the proportion of all great bank securities held in the form of government securities. 
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banks were roughly similar. The predominance of underwriting and brokerage functions among 
the universal banks, however, should have led to higher levels of securities holdings.at German 
banks compared to the British commercial banks. Thus far, the numbers for the German banks 
have included securities holdings resulting from their underwriting and brokerage business.34 
A significant portion of the universal banks' total investments arose out of their involvement in 
underwriting consortia (or syndicates) .  These participations therefore include some shares that 
remained on the banks' books only temporarily and because of the banks' inability to place the 
shares. Thus, Figure 4 also plots out the non-government securities held by the great banks 
that did not arise out of the syndicate business. 35 This series gives an approximation of the 
proportion of assets the universal banks may have held as non-government securities had the 
universal banks focused primarily on commercial activities. 
It is useful to compare the estimates for the largest German banks to the securities hold-
ings of British institutions engaged in investment banking. Phillip Cottrell provides two such 
examples, and his data illuminate the extent of securities holdings of investment bankers in 
the mid- to late-nineteenth century. One example comes from the General Credit and Finance 
Company, which in 1866 held approximately 15 percent of its assets in the form of securities. 
The majority (approximately three quarters) of this amount was held as shares. 36 Many of 
these shares were probably of railway companies, but it is impossible to tell from the given 
figures. 
34 According to Riesser (1910), the largest universal banks earned approximately half of their gross profits from 
underwriting and brokerage services. 
35Non-syndicate securities were estimated using a similar method as that described for non-government secu­
rities. For the years in which disaggregated securities holdings were reported (1912 to 1919), syndicate-related 
securities amounted to 51 to 61 percent of total securities held. As with government securities, I used the lowest 
number during the period to estimate the proportion of securities due to syndicate participations. 
36Cottrell (1985), p. 419, reproduces the firm's balance sheet as given in The Economist of November 1866. 
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A second investment bank, the International Financial Society, apparently held even higher 
proportion of securities among its assets. In 1872, the bank kept nearly a· quarter of its assets 
in the form of securities and listed another 50 p�rcent in the form of 'lock-ups. '37 'Lock-ups' 
included all assets not readily liquidated, and as such, consisted partially of loans. By 1877, the 
International Financial Society had increased its securities holdings to 56 percent of assets. 38 By 
contrast, the German universal banks reported liquidity coefficients (the ratio of immediately 
available or quick assets to total liabilities) of 85 percent in 1893. These figures gradually 
declined by more than 20 points over the ensuing 15 years. 39 
Naturally, these banks cannot be compared directly with the German universal banks, but 
the forgoing examples do support the notion that the great banks in particular, because of their 
active engagement in investment banking, should be expected to have held a significantly greater 
share of their assets in the form of securities than did the British deposit banks. Comparison 
with the British investment banks also underscores the potential inconsistency in the idea that 
universal banks could hold substantial long-term (illiquid) engagements with industrial firms 
and still operate a commercial business on the order of the British deposit banks. 
To understand· how important the banks' direct investment in industrial companies may 
have been for the growth of the economy, it is useful to combine the data on bank investments 
with that on bank assets relative to the economy as a whole. Table 2 reports the results of the 
calculation and indicates that the non-government securities holdings of the universal banks 
ranged between two and four percent of GNP for the three decades preceding World War I. 
Even if the estimates are only approximately correct, the banks' holdings of non-government 
37 Ibid, p. 538. 
38 Ibid, p. 599. 
39lliesser (1911), p. 655, discusses the banks' liquidity at length. 
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securities accounted for a very small share of the economy. The German banks' share did 
increase after 1880, but their holdings of non-government securities still only amounted to four 
percent of G�P by 1913. Furthermore, the biggest part of the increase came after the major 
push of industrializatioh in Germany. 
Table 2 here. 
The British banks' holdings of non-government securities, though also low relative to GNP, 
were significantly higher than the German numbers throughout the period. In contrast to 
the German case, the banks' securities share of GNP rose between 1880 and 1900 and then 
leveled off. Given the measurement difficulties already discussed, however, it is best not to 
overemphasize the differences between the German and British numbers. Nonetheless, these 
calculations cast doubt on the idea that the banks' holdings of securities provided a significant 
stimulus to either the German or the British economies during the last half of the nineteenth 
century.40 
It is often claimed thq,t the British banks held only gilt-edged securities in their po_rtfolios 
and that the German banks participated more actively and directly in risky, start-up ven-
tures. The official figures, however, do not allow specific types of securities to be distinguished. 
Such distinctions, unfortunately, depend on spottier evidence from individual banks. German 
Bank records for the pre-1880 period are generally unavailable.41 Nonetheless, some details are 
available for two of the earliest German joint-stock universal banks. 
400ne might raise the point that market capitalization represented a greater share of the economy in Britain 
than in Germany. Thus, the banks' equity holdings may actually represent a greater proportion of share capital 
in Germany than in the UK. Such figures may be interesting from the point of view of the banks' involvement in 
the secondary market for shares, but the ultimate impact of the banks must be measured against the economy 
as a whole. 
41The chief archivists of both the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank have indicated that the archives 
contain no details of securities owned in the pre-1914 era. 
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Figure 5 brings together the available data and traces the movements in the ratio of total 
securities to assets for these two banks.42 The solid lines represent the holdings of the Disconto-
Gesellschaft, while the squared points plot the data for Darmstadter Bank. The fine line 
comprises all securities held by the DG over. the period 1852 to 1900 and indicates that such 
holdings ranged between zero and 35 percent of assets over the period. The bank held no 
securities in its first four years. The proportion of securities holdings rose to around 12 percent 
of assets in 1856 and grew rapidly over the following few years. The bank seems to have 
unloaded securities during the boom years of the early 1870s but then took on extremely high 
shares of securities during the middle of that decade. While the bank's holdings continued 
to fluctuate throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, the proportion of securities 
followed a generally downward trend toward the end of the period. 
figure 5 here. 
A quantitative breakdown of securities 1856 to 1865 indicates that two mining companies, 
Heinrichshiitte and Bleialf, accounted for the lion's share of DG's industrial holdings; averaging 
around 11 perc�nt of bank assets during this period. Dabritz chronicles the bank's involvement 
with these firms and indicates that direct participation arose out of the bank's intention to 
convert the firms into joint-stock companies. 
Having bought up Heinrichshi.itte in 1857, the bank invested heavily (equivalent to 25 per-
cent of the firm's capital) in the expansion of production capacity. The timing was inopportune; 
immediately the firm faced rapidly-falling prices of iron and uncertainty about the profitability 
42Walther Dii.britz (1931) presented a sketch of the activities of the Disconto-Gesellschaft (DG) in its early 
years, and a later Festschrift published the annual accounts of the bank through 1900. Evidence from a different 
source, Saling 's Borsen-Jahrbv.ch, sheds light on the holdings of the Darmstii.dter Bank (Bank fiir Handel und 
Indus.trie) . 
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, .  
of ironworks in general. In the six years following the bank's investment in the ironworks, ac-
cording to Dabritz, "hardly a general meeting passed in which the bank's management did not 
have to defend against sharp criticisms about the purchase of Heinrichshiitte.�3 The other two 
firms presented similar problems for DG, and the bank was forced to hold their shares until 
they could extricate themselves in the more favorable market of the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
The heavier line in figure 4 shows the proportion of DG's assets held in securities other than 
Bleialf and Heinrichshiitte. The vast majority of these assets were held in relatively conservative 
investments: government debt, railway shares and bonds, and other priority bonds and shares. 
With the exception of a few unimportant holdings of shares, the DG confined its participation in 
industry to three companies (the two already discussed plus another mining concern) . Indeed, 
the bank's holdings of industry stocks amounted to between zero and three percent of its assets 
for the years in which disaggregated data are available (1852-1865) .44 
In his discussion of the early industrial promotion activities of the Bank fiir Handel und 
Industrie, another of the great banks, Tilly (1967) shows that, while the bank was energetic in 
such activities in its first 4 years, it had difficulty placing shares at reasonable prices. By the 
early 1860's, BHI had extricated itself from this side of the business and had turned to railway 
and government finance. Thus, it can hardly be argued that even the early activities of the 
great banks involved extensive, direct involvement in industrial companies. 
Though the disaggregated data for DG run out before the second wave of the German 
industrialization hit its peak, the story can be picked up in the 1880s using evidence from the 
Darmstadter Bank (BHI) . Table 3 gives securities by broadly-defined type for 1896�99 as well 
43Diibritz (1931 ) .  p. 105. The firm's earnings yielded only a two percent average return on the bank's invested 
capital. 
44 lbid. 
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as the individual industrial shares owned at several points throughout the 1880s and 90s-both 
taken from Saling 's.45 It is clear from the figures in Table 3 that holdings of industrial shares 
amounted to less than one percent of BHI's assets for most-Of-the 1880's and 90's, and that, even 
at its peak, the proportion of industrial shares to assets only reached 1.3 percent (in 1882) .  �he , 
top section of Table 3 gives the breakdown among various types of securities and shows that, 
including railway and real estate shares, the total of non-bank equity shares probably reached 
only four percent of assets. When bank shares are included, the total rises to no more than 6 .5 
percent . It should be underscored that the earlier numbers are estimated based on the ratio 
of industrial shares to total securities for the period in which both types of data are reported 
(1896 and 1897) . 46 Finally, BHI reported s�bstantial holdings of only 12 different companies 
between 1882 and 1897 and no more than seven firms in any one year. Together, these data 
provide further support for the notion that the great banks invested a relatively small portion 
of their portfolios in long-term stakes in industrial firms.47 
Table 3 here. 
As for the securities holdings in · Britain, Goodhart provides some details for three British 
commercial banks (Metropolitan Bank, London and Midland, and Union Bank) .  Nearly all 
of the investments reported consisted of British, colonial, or foreign government securities or 
railway stocks and bonds. Given his warnings about the banks' desire to hide any �nvestments 
45BHI published unusually detailed accounts of its securities holdings, and Saling 's reproduced the information 
in its series on Berlin-listed companies. Unfortunately, Saling 's only began publishing in 1876, and the volumes 
before 1882 are scarce. Also unfortunate for this analysis, Saling 's stopped publishing details of securities holdings 
in 1899. 
46The proportion of assets held in industrial, railway, or bank shares for those years peaked at 3.7 percent. 
Thus, only if BHI held a significantly greater part of its securities in the form of bank shares in the 1880s than 
in the 1890s (doubtful, given that the concentration of banking accelerated in the 1890s) , would 6.5 percent be 
an underestimate. 
47 Again, it is recognized that the experiences of two banks may not necessarily be generalized to the population 
as a whole, however, these two banks do represent one fourth of the great banks. 
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in industrial firms, however, it is impossible to tell for sure what industrial shares the banks 
may have held. Edelstein, however, has provided estimates of securities holdings in the U .K. 
more generally, and those results indicate an expansion of industrial holdings between 1871 and 
1913. Industrial concerns and railways, both foreign and domestic, accounted for 37 percent of 
all securities holdings in 1871 and 62 percent by World War I. Home companies alone increased 
from 4 to 17 percent 
.
of U.K. holdings over the period.48 For the period between 1883 and 
1907, Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback (1986) find that the financial community owned 
around five percent of UK share value and averaged four percent stakes in those companies. In 
addition, public companies, some of which may have been banks, held nearly four percent of 
domestic share capital. The banks might be expected to have participated to some extent in 
these investments, though firm proof of such a contention is apparently unavailable. Yet even 
if the British banks held no industrial shares, the evidence for DG and BHI suggest that the 
German universal banks were not far ahead on this count. 49 
It is important to note that the banks' ownership of shares, at the margin, may have provided 
important injections of liquidity or signals of quality for newly public firms. In a thin market 
for industrial securities, and in cases of· lumpy investments, such holdings may permit firms 
to invest where they otherwise would not have. Thus, small and transient equity stakes may 
increase the quantity of investment ( s in equation 1 ) ,  even if they do not have the qualitative, 
efficiency effects that long-term holdings are thought to have. The aggregate evidence here, 
however, still indicates that such holdings represented a small proportion of bank assets; and 
48Edelstein (1970), p. 235-7. 
49The Societe Generale pour Favoriser L'lndustrie Nationale in Brussels offers an interesting comparison. 
This bank held 27 percent of its assets in the form of industrial shares in 1849 and gradually increased such 
participation to nearly 40 percent by 1852. In 1849, this bank held stakes in around forty firms. See Otto 
Hiibner ( 1854), pp. 170-6. 
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the examples of Disconto-gesellschaft and BHI suggest that only a few firms would have been 
affected. Since such equities may not have made it onto the banks' books, 'though, it is difficult 
. 
to estimate the ultimate impact of transient holdings. 
Share ownership represents only the most direct kind of involvement in industrial firms. 
The banks may have also participated indirectly in companies either through proxy voting of 
customers' shares or through positions in the firms' supervisory boards. 50 Because of their 
combination of underwriting, brokerage, and commercial services, the German banks probably 
obtained greater control of industrial shares than did the British banks. Since shares taken 
as collateral or simply held as a service to customers would not appear in the. banks' balance 
sheets, and since firms did not have to reveal their shareholders, it is virtually impossible to 
quantify the extent of proxy voting by the German banks. 
It is possible to quantify board positions, and such data suggest that the bank directors 
held positions in relatively few companies. Approximately 23 percent of German joint- stock 
companies had a private banker or bank managei: on their supervisory boards, but only half of 
these attached companies received representation from the great banks. 51 
Proxy votes and supervisory board positions may have enabled banks to monitor their 
investments and even control the use of bank funds. From a theoretical perspective, however, 
it is unclear whether such indirect participation yields the same kind of incentive effects as 
direct ownership. In theory, at least, systems in which banks exert control over investment 
decisions, but do not align their incentives with the firms' through equity stakes, force firms 
50The German supervisory board is comprised of shareholders' representatives. Currently, this body must also 
represent the firm's workers. 
51 Fohlin (1997a, b) discuss the prevalence, sectoral distribution, and determinants of interlocking directorates 
between banks and firms. 
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into excessively safe and thus inefficient investment programs. So, the German system of proxy 
voting and interlocking directorates may have increased bank control and. oversight, but it may 
have led to m_gre internal financing and less in the way of risky investments. Therefore, if the 
British bankers did wield less control over firms' investment decisions, then the British financial 
system may have yielded greater efficiency through benign neglect. 
Concluding Remarks 
The banking and economic history literature has made much of the apparent disparities in 
the structure and performance of the British and German banking systems; the banks tradition­
ally have been presumed to have contributed more to economic development in Germany than 
in the UK. Based on recent theoretical models of economic growth, Equation 1 delineated three 
paths through which the financial system may promote real growth of the economy: quantity, 
quality, and efficiency of investment. Using evidence on bank financial structure, this paper 
has compared the contributions of the British and German banking systems in the first two 
of these three areas. The ·results yield no compelling evidence that one system consistently or 
significantly outperformed the other in raising the quantity or quality of investment. 
The analysis demonstrates that the German universal banks, despite their involvement in 
all facets of corporate finance, accounted for a markedly smaller proportion of the economy 
than did the British banks. Further, the large gap of the 1880s, much of which may have been 
. due to the later onset of industrialization in Germany than in Britain, only began to diminish 
after 1894 and never fully disappeared. The universal banks may have, however, expanded 
their available capital at a faster rate, since they invested or lent a greater share of their total 
liabilities than did the British banks. Much of the disparity in cash-liability ratios, however, 
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stems from the significantly higher share of deposits among the liabilities of the British banks. 
Until the late 1890s, the· German banks actually maintained higher cash-deposit ratios than the 
UK banks did. Only with the serious onset of the deposit business in the mid-1890s did the 
German cash-deposit ratios begin their stead( decline. 
In situations in which external capital is needed to finance new ventures, banks may improve 
the quality of investment by taking equity positions in the firms they fund. Though the German 
banks are frequently credited for their active participation in industry, the findings show that 
the universal banks held only a small share of their portfolios in the form of industrial equities. 
Furthermore, evidence from two of the largest universal banks suggest that the universal banks 
may have held stakes in only a few firms and often did so for lack of demand for their shares. 
Based on the theoretical work on bank equity stakes, the paper also argues that, if the German 
banks wielded greater control (through board positions, for example) than the British banks 
over firms they financed but took no greater equity stakes in those firms, then the German 
system of relationship banking may actually have led to under-investment in risky projects. 
This paper has raised the possibility that the German banks were constrained in their choice 
of investment and reserve holdings by the extent of the secondary market in securities. In addi­
tion, the findings suggest that the universal banks' equity st.akes, proxy votes, and supervisory 
board positions in industrial firms likely arose primarily out of the banks' involvement in un­
derwriting and brokerage services. Thus, the extent of the secondary market is linked to the 
structure of the banks and to regulations on the financial system. 
Given the German experience, it is important to determine whether market internalization 
arises endogenously in a universal system or resulted specifically in the German case from the 
regulation of the stock exchanges. Listing requirements in Germany seem to have necessitated 
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investment banks or groups of investment banks large enough to underwrite the entire capi-
tal of new issues and with sufficient contacts to place the underwritten shares. 52 In addition, 
transactions taxes encouraged trading outside of the exchange. Thus, the regulation that en-
couraged the growth of universal banking in Germany also may have inhibited the development 
of securities markets. Therefore, the existence of universal banking, per se, may not hamper 
the functioning of securities markets. 
Clearly, further work on this subject is required. But if specialized and universal systems 
of finance generally provide similar quantities and qualities of investment, then efficiency may 
prove to be the crucial determinant of the relative growth effects of the two systems. Universal 
banking may yield economies of scale or scope compared to a specialized system, but these 
economies may also lead to excessive concentration, market power, and inefficiency in the 
banking sector. In addition, the internalization of the secondary securities market within the 
banking system may hamper both the efficient distribution of financial capital and the market 
for corporate control. Such factors bear directly on the costs of finance, and such costs, as 
shown in equation 1 ,  influence economic growth. 
From the historical perspective, this paper makes further progress toward vindicating the 
British banks for their alleged under-performance over the .half century before the first world 
war. At the same time, the findings here cast some doubt on the common perception that 
the German universal banks offered significant advantages in mobilizing capital and promoting 
particularly high-quality investment. Furthermore, the cases of Disconto-gesellschaft and the 
Darmstiidter Bank indicate quite strongly that without a significant period of real development, 
52For �xample, a firm wishing to gain listing on the stock exchange, among other things, was required to have 
fully paid up share capital. 
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financial institutions can offer only limited benefits for economic growth. As Tilly suggested 
thirty years ago about the universal banks, "where other ingredients of industrialization were 
in short supply, such institutions could produce few result&-of significance. "  53 It may still be 
true that German industry has outperformed its British counterpart, but this paper sugge�ts 
that differences in banking structure are probably not the cause. 
53Tilly (1967) , pp. 114-5. 
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Appendix A 
While the level of investments may be important on its own, it is more illuminating to mea-
sure securities relative to other assets. Cash is fairly straightforward to compare internationally, 
however, other bank assets may be less obviously similar. It is therefore necessary to address 
the comparability of the various assets held by the banks. The data on investments come from 
published balance sheets, and accounting conventions differed somewhat between the two coun-
tries. Nonetheless, the various assets can, to some extent, be categorized by purpose, liquidity, 
maturity, and riskiness. 
For both the British commercial banks and the German universal banks, financial assets 
other than investments fall into four broad liquidity or maturity classes: cash, very short-term 
loans, bills of exchange, and loans and advances. In the British case, very short-term loans, 
termed 'money at call, '  consisted primarily of loans to stock brokers for transactions in the 
London discount market or the London Stock Exchange.54 Universal banks usually included 
call money ( tiiglisches Geld) under the more general heading of lombards and reports. While 
typically also maturing within days or weeks, German lombard loans provided credit both 
for securities transactions and for covering lags between merchandise delivery and payment. 
Despite some divergence of purpose, both German and British banks made short-term loans on 
similar collateral (bills of exchange and other securities) ,  and their liquidity and maturity were 
comparable. 55 
It is important to note that the British and German banks may have booked their assets 
in different ways. The British commercial banks supposedly valued investments at or just 
54See Goodhart, 1972, for further descriptions of bank balance sheet items. 
55See Riesser, 1911, for details of the specific conditions on lombard loans made by one of the great banks, 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. 
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below market value, yet "investments could be held on the books at any valuation, subject, of 
course, to the auditors' approval. "56 Furthermore, it is clear that some banks failed to report 
any securities other than British, colonial, or other so-called gilt-edged investments. "Their 
holdings of these other securities were included with their advances or the miscellaneous item, 
to taste ."57 Thus, the British banks' investments are probably undervalued relative to other 
financial assets, though fixed assets were written down as quickly as possible in order to bolster 
hidden reserves. 
The German universal banks also undervalued their assets ,  but again, the extent is uncer-
tain. According to Riesser, "considerable security holdings are not regarded as a favorable sign, 
although during critical periods large holdings of this class may represent an increased pro-
portion of particularly liquid assets, or a special reserve for deposits." 58 He goes on to explain 
that 
excessive holdings of securities will be int�rpreted to mean either that the times 
have not been propitious for the issue business of the bank, or that it maintains 
excessive speculative engagements, or that it is involved to an excessive extent in 
speculative transactions on its own account . . .  or, finally, that it has been unable to 
find sufficiently profitable employment for its funds. It is for these reasons that 
a large proportion of the writing off done by the banks occurs under the head of 
securities account."59 
In comparing the British and German banks, the important consideration is the relative 
extent of undervaluing, and that information, by its very nature, is difficult to ascertain. 
56See Goodhart ( 1972) ,  p. 21 .  He offers an extensive discussion of the accounting procedures of the banks. 
57 Ibid, p. 21.  
58lliesser (1911) ,  p. 402. 
59lliesser (1911 ) ,  p. 402-3. 
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Table I 
Assets of Financial Institutions 
Germany (billions of Marks) 1860 1880 . 1900 1913 
Central bank 0.95 1.57 2.57 4.03 
Large (nationwide) banks 0.39 1 .35 6.96 8.39 
Regional (local) banks 13.65 
Private bankers 1 . 50 2.50 3.50 4.00 
Specialized commercial banks 0.98 
Savings banks, local 0.51 2.78 9.45 20.8 
Savings banks, central 1.76 
Credit unions, local 0.01 0.59 1 .68 5.73 
Credit unions, central 0.47 
Private mortgage banks 0.04 1 .85 7.50 13.55 
Public mortgage banks 0.68 1 .76 4.05 7.20 
Life insurance companies 0.07 0.44 2.42 5.64 
Property insurance companies 0.35 0.83 2.05 
Social insurance organizations 0.87 2.44 
Total for all financial institutions 4.15 13.19 39.83 90.69 
Joint-stock credit banks/total 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.24 
Joint-stock & private banks/total 0.46 0.29 0.26 0.29 
Assets of financial institutions/GNP 0.40 0.73 1 .14 1 .58 
Joint-stock & private banks/GNP 0.18 0.21 0.30 0.45 
Great Britain (millions of Pounds} 
Bank of England 55 75 93 100 
Deposit banks 150 432 879 1 ,146 
Private banks 120 200 62 53 
Post office savings banks 35 134 187 
Trustee savings banks 42 47 57 71 
Building societies 10 54 60 65 
cws and sews banks 1 6 
Discount houses 35 37 67 
Investment companies and trusts 100 
Life and other private insurance companies 80 155 311  530 
Collecting societies 5 1 1  
Industrial and provident societies 1 1  34 78 
Friendly societies 33 54 
National insurance funds 21 
Total for deposit banks & private banks 270 632 941 1 ,199 
Total for all financial institutions 457 1 ,044 1 ,806 2,389 
Deposit banks/total 0.33 0.41 0.49 0.48 
Deposit & private banks/total 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.50 
Assets of financial institutions/GNP 0.57 0.95 0.93 1 .03 
Deposit & private banks/GNP 0.34 0.58 0.49 0.52 
Source: Goldsmith (1972). 
Notes: Assets of large and regional German banks are summed through 1900. Estimates are italicized. 
Table II 
Bank Holdings of Non-Government Securities/ GNP 
Germany 
Britain 
1880 
0.022 
0.044 
1900 
0.027 
0.063 
1913 
0.040 
0.058 
Source: Calculated from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976) and Goldsmith (1972). 
Table III 
Securities held by Darmstadter Bank (1882-1899) 
Securities by Type Value of shares (thousands of Marks) 
1882 1886 1890 - 1896 1897. 1898 1899 
German and Prussian bonds 1 ,845 1 ,301 1 ,145 5 ,909 
Foreign government and railroad debt 1,422 89r 4,797 3,230 
Railway, industry, and land shares 6,000 4,119 4,990 5,104 3,942 3,343 4,741 
Bank shares 2,571 1 ,950 1,919 1 ,694 
�-Miscellaneous 1 ,033 965 681 955 
' Total securities 1 1 ,975 9,049 1 1,885 16,529 
Total assets 146,516 169,532 181,133 206,761 188,865 232,762 235,372 
Rail, ind. , and land shares/securities 0.512 0.542 0.339 0.345 
Shares/ assets 0.041 0.024 · 0. 028 0.025 0.021 0.014 0.020 
Shares plus miscell. securities/assets 0.030 0.026 0.017 0.024 
Government securities/total securities 0.154 0.144 0.096 0.357 
All securities/total assets 0.058 0.048 0.051 0.070 
Industrial Shares Owned 
Wiirttemb. Kattunmanufaktur 303 158 14 0 0 
Dessauer Wollengarn-Spinnerei 720 690 690 690 690 
Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheide-Anstalt 420 0 0 0 0 
Frankfurter Hotel-AG 152 0 0 0 0 
Deutsche Wasserwerke 96 96 96 96 96 
Rheinische Wasserwerke 90 0 0 0 0 
Heilbronner Maschinenbau-Gesellschaft 86 86 0 0 0 
� Wetterauer Zuckerfabrik 0 150 150 150 150 
· Gross-Gerauer Zuckerfabrik 0 121 121 . 121 121 
Franken Compania Metalurgica de Mazarron 0 0 113 1 13 113 
Heilbronner Salzwerks 0 0 288 73 73 
Maschinen-anstalt Venulath & Ellenberger 0 0 0 100 100 
Miscellaneous 36 52 
Total industrial shares 1 ,903 1 ,353 1 ,472 1 ,343 1 ,343 
Industrial participations/total assets 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 
Source: Saling's Biirsen-Jahrbuch, various years. 
Note: Estimates are in italics. 
